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CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM: A REVIEW
Paul G. Kauper*

Supreme Court's opinion in the Everson case1 declaring that
the separation-of-church-and-state limitation derived from the First
Amendment was equally applicable to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment opened up new vistas on the church-state problems in this
country. Opponents of released time programs were quick to seize the
opening thus afforded as evidenced by the litigation in the McCollum2
and Zorach3 cases. And even before the Everson case reached it, the
Supreme Court, thanks almost entirely to the efforts of Jehovah's Witnesses,4 had been engaged at length with the task of defining the dimensions of religious freedom as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.
A gratifying feature of this legal development was the stimulation of
further research in this area by interested scholars. Anson Phelps
Stokes' monumental three-volume work, Church and State in the
United States/; appeared in 1950. Wilfrid Parsons' The First Freedom6
and James Milton O'Neill's Religion and Education under the Constitution,7 both critical of the general ideas expressed in the Everson
opinion and the results portended by it, appeared in 1948 and 1949,
respectively. A series of articles appeared simultaneously in the law
journals.8
Leo Pfeffer's Church, State, and Freedom9 is the latest extended
treatment. Unlike the other writers mentioned above, Pfeffer is a
lawyer, and the book's jacket properly describes the book as the first full
length treatment of the subject by a specialist in the law. The author

T

HE

,,. Professor of Law, University of Michigan-Ed.
lEverson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947), holding valid the
payment at public expense of the cost of transporting children by bus to parochial schools.
2 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948), holding
invalid a released time arrangement for religious instruction on public school premises.
s Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952), holding valid a released time
arrangement for religious instruction of!: the school premises.
4 See Waite, "The Debt of Constitutional Law to Jehovah's Witnesses," 28 MINN. L.
REv. 209 (1944).
Ii New York: Harper, 1950.
6 New York: D. X. McMullen Co., 1948.
7New York: Harper, 1949.
s See, inter alia, the series of articles by Edward S. Corwin, John Courtney Murray,
Milton R. Konvitz, Alexander Meiklejohn, Charles Fahy, Russell N. Sullivan, William A.
Mitchell and Monrad G. Paulsen in 14 LAw & CoNTEM. PnoB. l et seq. (1949). Also,
Sutherland, ''Due Process and Disestablishment," 62 H.mv. L. REv. 1306 (1949), and
Katz, "Religion and State Neutrality," 20 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 426 (1953).
9 Boston: The Beacon Press, 1953.
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has indeed achieved great distinction as a lawyer. He is Associate
General Counsel of the American Jewish Congress and has participated
in some of the recent litigation involving church-state questions.10
In commenting on his book it may be noted at the outset that this
is a valuable contribution to the literature on the subject. It reflects
thorough scholarship and expert handling of the legal materials. But
while an excellent legal treatise, this volume assumes added value
because of the treatment of the historical materials and the careful
consideration of the policy factors underlying the problems embraced
in this area. This book must be rated high on the list of required
reading not only for the specialists in the field but for all persons interested in a more adequate understanding of issues underlying current
controversial problems of an explosive character.
Pfeffer has given us a fair and thorough treatment of these issues.
The book is admirably objective in this sense. But as is evident to anyone who has given thought to these problems and to the literature
dealing with them, this is an area where subjective considerations define
the main channels of argument and discussion. Strong feelings and
emotions are easily aroused by discussion of many of these questions.
Basic predilections and prejudices enter into a person's consideration
of these questions and help shape his conceptions of what is wise policy
in their solution. It is clear that these basic subjective considerations
help shape the formal premises that govern the legal treatment of these
problems.
No doubt can be entertained on Pfeffer's basic predilection. He
espouses a rigid separation doctrine and strongly supports Justice Black's
"wall of separation" thesis developed in the Everson opinion.11 For
this reason he is critical of Justice Douglas' opinion in the Zorach case12
which he correctly interprets as a substantial departure from the philosophy expressed in both the E11erson13 and McCollum14 cases.
The first four chapters of Pfeffer's book furnish an excellent discussion of the background of the ideas stated in the First Amendment.
The initial chapter gives an account of old world antecedents and points
10 He successfully argued the recent case for the appellant in Tudor v. Board of
Education of the Borough of Rutherford, 14 N.J. 31, 100 A. (2d) 857 (1953), where the
Supreme Court of New Jersey declared invalid the action of a school board in permitting
the use of a public school for the distribution of the King James version of the Bible by the
Gideons International.
11 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947),
12 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952).
13 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947).
14McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948).
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up the unfortunate consequences resulting from a commingling of the
functions of church and state. Chapter two surveys the present solution of these problems in other countries. Church-state relationships
during the colonial period in America furnish the theme of the third
chapter, and the fourth chapter traces the rise of the separation principle in American thinking and its crystallization in the First Amendment. In the development of these materials the writer makes the
important point that the separation principle found its unique expression in American thinking not only because of the great diversity of
sects that characterize American religious life but also because of the
impact of ideological considerations centered on notions of individual
freedom.15
In the fifth chapter the author turns to the meaning of the separation principle as expressed in the language of the First Amendment
that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Here he enters into an area of
sharp controversy. He states as a basic proposition that the First Amendment did not take away any powers but was designed to confirm the
limitation previously implied in the original Constitution that Congress
had no legislative power in this area.16 This point is important to his
total thesis that the separation principle derived from this language in
the First Amendment is a limitation on all the agencies of the federal
government and not simply the legislative power. Pfeffer states a persuasive case on this point. Despite Professor Crosskey's general thesis
that the Constitution gave general powers to the central government
and that the First Amendment therefore served as a limitation on
powers otherwise exercisable,1 7 Pfeffer's argument is in line with the
traditional view that the federal government possesses only powers
expressly or impliedly delegated to it.
Pfeffer emphatically rejects the idea that the opening language of
the First Amendment states two separate ideas, i.e., non-establishment
of religion, on the one hand, and freedom of religion on the other.
Rather than stating a dichotomy of ideas, the First Amendment, according to Pfeffer's interpretation, states a unitary principle of separation
of church and state embracing the twin aspects of non-establishment
and non-intervention.18 Together they embody the single idea that
church and state functions shall be kept separate. Here we have the
111 PPBI'l'BR, CHmtCH, STATE, AND FRBBDOM

81-82 (1953).

1s Id., pp. 115-118.
172 CnossKBY, PoL1Tics AND THB CoNsnnrr:roN 1057, 1074-1075 (1953).
18PFBI'l'BR, CHmtCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM

121-124 (1953).
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basis of the "wall of separation" idea propounded in the Everson19 and
McCollum20 opinions and strongly supported by the author. Obviously
this is a crucial matter. Is separation of church and state itself the
primary limitation to be drawn from the first two phrases of the First
Amendment or is separation only a by-product of the two central limitations that Congress shall neither make a law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof'? The latter
suggests no wall of separation as the governing principle but rather
that separation is required only to the extent that it is necessary in order
to prevent establishment and assure the free exercise of religion. This
appears to be the idea expressed by Justice Douglas in the Zorach
case,21 and it is understandable that the author is critical of the Zorach
opinion.22 Much the same conclusion as that expressed in the Zorach
opinion is reached by Professor Katz in his illuminating article23 where
he develops the thesis that the First Amendment's concern is with neutrality on the part of the government so far as religious matters are concerned and that this neutrality is designed to secure religious liberty
as its principal objective. For this reason Professor Katz contends that
the. separation principle in so far as it is derived from the First Amendment must be construed and limited by the principle of religious liberty
and where the two come in conflict the separation principle must yield
to the paramount consideration in favor of religious liberty. Thus Pro19 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947).
20 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948).
21 "There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment re.llects

the philosophy that Church and State should be separated. And so far as interference with the 'free
exercise' of religion and an 'establishment' of religion are concerned, the separation must
be complete and unequivocal. The First Amendment within the scope of its coverage
permits no exception; the prohibition is absolute. The First Amendment, however, does not
say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather,
it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or
union or dependency one on the other. That is the common sense of the matter. Otherwise,
the state and religion would be aliens to each other-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly."
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 at 312, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952).
22 PFEFFER, CmmCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 123, 156-159 (1953).
23 "Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality," 20 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 426 (1953).
''This passage [referring to the part of Justice Douglas' opinion quoted in note 21 supra]
suggests that 'separation of church and state' is not an independent principle, that the
primary principle is that of religious liberty-protected by the First Amendment against
governmental action either establishing religion or prohibiting its free exercise. These
protections are conveniently summarized in the phrase 'separation of church and state,'
since religion is thus to be insulated from governmental power whether exerted for its
establishment or to prohibit its free exercise.
''In many situations, however, complete separation of church and state would operate
to restrain religious freedom. Where this is the case, the opinion [in the Zorach case]
implies, there is no constitutional requirement of separation. In other words, the limits
of the separation doctrine are to be found by reference to the constitutional principle of
religious liberty, not vice versa." p. 428.
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fessor Katz defends the constitutionality of public subsidization of
parochial school transportation costs and of released time programs
since they serve to implement religious freedom and thereby preserve
the state's neutrality in dealing with religious matters. Indeed, Professor Katz reaches the conclusion that this principle would warrant
public subsidies in aid of parochial school education.24
It is clear that Pfeffer's consolidation of the non-establishment and
free exercise limitations into an overriding and absolute separation
principle is subject to challenge and that his thesis on this point is not
supported by the latest expression of the Supreme Court. But in justice
to him it should also be noted that Pfeffer admits the point stressed by
Professor Katz. He recognizes that it is at times a matter of great difficulty to know where the non-establishment principle ends and the free
exercise principle begins,25 and he concedes that in some instances
freedom of religion is served by violating the non-establishment idea.
Thus in explaining the use of tax moneys to pay for chaplains serving
the armed forces he gives as one reason that this is necessary in order
to assure a religious ministry to those who under compulsion of law are
separated from the normal environment where they enjoy freedom in
the exercise of their religion.26 Whatever the theory, it is evident that
governmental support of military chaplains represents a considerable
breach in the alleged wall of separation.
In explaining how the First Amendment's limitations have come
to be imposed upon the states in the name of the Fourteenth Amendment, Pfeffer states that the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to equate the privileges and immunities of national citizenship
with the rights previously protected under the Bill of Rights against
impairment by the federal government.27 On this point he apparently
takes at its face value the conclusion reached by Justice Black in his
dissenting opinion in the Adamson case28 and ignores the contrary
conclusion reached by Professor Fairman after extended research into
the historical materials relevant to this question. 29 But apart from this
24 Id., p. 440.
2llPPBFFER, CmmCH, STAT.I!, AND FlU!EDOM
26 Id., pp. 151, 217-218.
21 Id., pp. 127-128.

123-124 (1953).

2s Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947).
29 "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights'? The Original
Understanding," 2 STANFORD L. REv. 5 (1949).
Pfeffer derives further support for his conclusion, however, from CRossKBY, PoLITics
AND THB CoNsnronoN, vol. II, pp. 1083-1118 (1953). Crosskey in footnote 11, at p.
1381, refers to Fainnan's treatment and states that Fairman adduces illegitimate considerations in determining the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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questionable assumption as to the original purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Pfeffer correctly points out that the substantive rights
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause resulted over a period of time in recognition of the fundamental liberties
secured against federal impairment under the First Amendment. Indeed, even prior to the Everson case the Court had said that the due
process clause incorporated all of the First Amendment limitations.30
It was, therefore, a logical and climactic progression in this train of
ideas for the Court to say as it did in the Everson case31 that the nonestablishment clause of the First Amendment was equally applicable
to the states. But to state this conclusion does not obviate what is
equally clear, namely, that in terms of our constitutional history the
non-establishment idea did not receive recognition as a federal limitation on state power until the Supreme Court so decided by tour de force
in 1946. Moreover, the recognition of the non-establishment limitation
as a facet of the due process interpretation suggests difficulties that have
not yet been fully resolved. Its recognition under the due process clause
must depend on whether the challenged state action is an arbitrary or
unreasonable deprivation of ''liberty" or "property." In other words,
any person in order to invoke the due process clause must show that
the challenged state action is an invalid establishment of religion either
because it impairs his own freedom of conscience or because it is a
substantial diversion of tax money in aid of religion. Constitutional
questions cannot be raised simply because a party wishes to vindicate
a constitutional principle. He must show impairment of his own rights.
Perhaps this is just another way of stating the idea expressed by Justice
Douglas in the Zorach case that the separation principle receives constitutional recognition only to the extent that it is necessary in order to
protect against non-establishment and interference with the free exercise of religion. 32 It explains also why the majority of the Court in the
Doremus case33 held that a taxpayer as such had no standing to raise
questions about the validity of a Bible-reading exercise in a public
school. It suggests also that there is merit in the doubts raised as to the
standing of Mrs. McCollum to raise questions about the validity of
the released time program in Champaign, Illinois.34 There was hardly
so See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900 (1940).
31 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947).
32 See note 21 supra.
33 Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 72 S.Ct. 394 (1952).
34 See Justice Jackson's concurring opinion on this point in McCollum v. Board of
Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948). See also Professor Corwin's sharp criticism
of this aspect of the case in his article, "The Supreme Court as National School Board,"
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a substantial diversion of taxpayers' money in aid of religion, and
whether her son's freedom of conscience and belief was in fact coerced
was not clearly demonstrated.
Beginning with the sixth chapter the author undertakes consideration of the more specific questions raised by the separation principle.
In this chapter he discusses state aid to religion. In terms of precedents
and accepted practices many difficulties are obviously presented in
attempting to prove the case for absolute separation. The author approaches this problem by stating that the federal rule35 which denies
standing to a federal taxpayer to question the validity of federal appropriations has precluded effective challenge to federal appropriations
which would appear to be in aid of religion. He correctly states that
inability to raise the question should not be accepted as conclusive
evidence that such spending is consistent with the First Amendment.36
Moreover, he makes out a persuasive case for relaxation of this rule
when the First Amendment freedoms are concerned.37 He further
develops the point that courts because of their own predilections and
community sentiment may be reluctant to invalidate financial grants
that appear to be in aid of religion. 38 But on this question it may
be observed that judicial prejudices may also in other instances result
in rigid application of the separation principle without due regard to
the element of religious liberty. The whole process whereby some of
the Bill of Rights limitations have been recognized as fundamental
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment is in itself a conspicuous
illustration of the normative and subjective element in the judicial
process.
Turning to specific cases, Mr. Pfeffer deals with federal grants to
hospitals owned and operated by religious bodies as part of a general
federal aid program in support of more adequate hospital facilities. 89
He is willing to justify this as a practice consistent with a rigid separation concept on the ground that the operation of hospitals is not strictly
a religious ·function but rather a general welfare function shared by
churches with public and other quasi-public agencies, and that therefore aid to religious hospitals is not really aid to religion so long as these
14 I.Aw & CoNTI!M. PnoB. 3 at 5-9 (1949), where he says that "Justice Black's brusque
disposal of the question of Mrs. McCollum's locus standi in court to maintain her action
reduces-or elevates-the doctrine of 'special interest' to a jurisdictional :fiction."
85Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597 (1923).
270 (1953).

86 PFEFFER, CmmcIJ, STATS, AND FREEDOM
87 Id., pp. 166-169.
88 Id., pp. 169-173.
89 Id., pp. 173-179.
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hospitals are required to admit patients without regard to religious
affiliation and so long as the religious element does not intrude too
conspicuously in the operation of the hospital. To the reviewer a more
satisfactory explanation of this practice is that operation of hospitals is
a religious function as well as a function of the state and that in areas
of overlapping functions the state should not be precluded from financial aid to religious bodies on a non-preferential basis since aid on such
an inclusive basis avoids discrimination on the ground of religion and
contributes thereby to the fuller exercise of religious freedom. This is
not to argue that the state must grant aid to religious hospitals. It may
well decide to limit aid to agencies under direct state control. Whether
it should include religious institutions in its aid program ought to be a
matter reserved for legislative discretion and judgment.
In regard to use of public property for religious purposes the author
distinguishes between streets and parks, on the one hand, and public
buildings on the other.40 He recognizes, of course, that it would be an
impairment of the religious freedom principle to deny the use o( streets
and parks for purposes of religious meetings and assemblies as long as
their use for other types of public meetings is permitted. But he defends
denial of the gratuitous use of public buildings for religious purposes
· on the ground that gratuitous use of this kind of public property which
is a distinct "economic asset" of the community as distinguished from
streets and parks would be a forbidden aid to religion. To the reviewer
this appears to be an artificial distinction. Admittedly there should be
a large element of discretion on the part of local authorities in determining the proper use of public buildings, but if their uses for community
purposes by various agencies is recognized it seems difficult to avoid the
conclusion that to permit their non-preferential use by religious organizations is a permissive practice in furtherance of religious liberty.
The problem of tax exemptions receives careful treatment from the
author. 41 He concludes that this form of economic aid when extended
to property used for religious purpo_ses can hardly be distinguished from
direct subsidies out of the public purse and that in principle the tax
exemption should be regarded as forbidden aid to religion, although he
is satisfied that courts will not disturb this situation. Here again the
reviewer feels that the more satisfactory explanation is that since the
tax exemption generally extends to many types of agencies operating
on a non-profit basis and serving some public purpose, the exemption
40 Id.,
41 Id.,

pp. 179-182; also pp. 554-561.
pp. 183-191.

1954]

CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM

837

for property used for religious purposes represents a permissive nonpreferential treatment of religious bodies in aid of the free exercise of
religion. To use Professor Katz's approach, the state strengthens its
position of neutrality when it does not discriminate against religion in
the granting of tax exemptions.
Congressional chaplains come in for treatment by the author.42 One
can hardly disagree with his conclusion that this is a plain case of spending federal money for religious purposes. But it can hardly be considered a substantial use of public funds in aid of religion,4 3 and it is not
seriously argued that anyone's conscience is coerced by this practice. In
any event the long history of this practice coupled with the difficulty
federal taxpayers experience in attacking federal spending make quite
clear that this practice is not likely to be challenged. Perhaps it, along
with other established practices, also makes clear that the country's
history does not support the views of the rigid separationists.
Previous reference was made to the author's discussion of military
chaplains.44 Here he concedes that this practice although representing
use of public funds in aid of religion can be justified since the denial
of the religious ministry of chaplains to men in the armed forces, tom
from their regular homes and environment, would impair their religious
liberty. In short, although the author does not state the matter in precisely these terms, the use of military chaplains is a capital example of
the principle that the separation notion as derived from the non-aid
limitation must yield to the higher principle of religious freedom. The
author throws in an additional argument to the effect that since the
ministry of chaplains helps to bolster the morale and efficiency of
soldiers, it can be defended as an exercise of the war powers which do
not readily admit of constitutional limitations. This impresses the
reviewer as a weak argument. The use of military chaplaincies can
surely be defended on grounds other than that it is a deliberate exploitation of religion to serve military purposes. Moreover, the notion that
government can directly aid religion in order to bolster morale suggests
implications of a wider use of public moneys in direct aid of religion.
In the chapter on church intervention in state affairs, the author
gives some pages to the part played by church bodies in influencing
42Jd., pp. 214-217.
43 Professor Sutherland in his article, ''Due Process and Disestablishment," 62 HAnv.
L. REv. 1306 at 1343-1344 (1949), suggests application of the de minimis principle to
some of the situations involving governmental aid to religion. Pfeffer contends that this
principle is not applicable in this area of constitutional law. CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 167-168.
44 PPEPPlll\, CHURCH, STATE, AND Fl!EEDOM 217-218 (1953).

838

MICHIGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 52

public policy and helping shape legislation. 45 This material is informative in character and is not designed to point to any conclusion that
such efforts by the churches violate the separation principle. Certainly
it would be a mistake to suppose that the separation idea precludes the
churches from employing their preaching and teaching functions in
such a way as to serve as the king's conscience. Whether the views of
religious bodies should be embodied in legislation is a matter to be
answered in the course of debate and discussion. The rights of such
bodies to express their views is an elementary exercise of religious
freedom. To be sure, it would be unconstitutional to adopt legislation
for the purpose only of enforcing distinctively religious practices. The
author properly states his objections to Sunday blue laws which in their
operation may serve to discriminate against Jews and Seventh Day
Adventists.46
In concluding his chapter on state intervention in church affairs,
Pfeffer deals at length with the highly controversial problem arising out
of President Truman's proposed appointment of an ambassador to the
Vatican.47 He carefully and fairly states and examines the opposing
arguments and states his own conclusion that such a proposed appointment would be unconstitutional either on the ground that it was an
alliance with a church or the participation by the federal government
in the affairs of a religious organization. The point is made by Pfeffer
in this connection that the difficulties that would be encountered in
attempting to secure judicial review of such an appointment should
not preclude discussion of its constitutional aspects by the Senate when
asked to ratify such an appointment. 48
In his ninth chapter Pfeffer turns to the questions that present the
largest area of current controversy and discussion-the public school
and religious education. As an introduction to his discussion of these
questions, he furnishes an informative summary statement of the development of the public school idea in this country and points out that
a principal feature of this development has been the abandonment of
religious instruction ·and religious practices in the public school program.40
The released time problem naturally secures a large measure of
attention from the author. 50 His own position is clear although he is
45 Id., pp.
46 Id., pp.
47 Id., pp.

192-206.
227-241.
257-273.
48 Id., p. 270.
49 Id., pp. 274-290.
50 Id., chapter 10, pp. 313-373.
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fair to state the opposing arguments. He is in complete agreement with

the result reached in the McCollum case51 and the opinion there expressed by Justice Black. In turn he is critical of the result in the
Zorach case52 and the opinion of Justice Douglas which in its rejection
of the rigid separation dogma presents a striking contrast to Justice
Black's thesis. The basic difficulty he sees in released time is that it
represents a use of the compulsory education laws to provide children
for religious instruction. Children are coerced to attend religious education classes since this is the price they must pay to he released from
school.5 3 This same emphasis runs through the dissenting opinions in
the Zorach case and in turn marked the central argument in the
McCollum case.
All students of this subject may well agree that Zorach for all practical purposes overruled McCollum. But in contrast to the author's
position, many thoughtful people may well agree that the Court was
wrong in finding the released time system invalid in the McCollum
case. It is probably true, as the author suggests,54 that the pressure of
adverse criticism and popular dissatisfaction prompted the Court to
retrace its steps in the Zorach opinion. This does not necessarily reflect
discredit on the Court, any more than its about-face in the £lag salute
cases'"' showed a lack of integrity in the Court's decisions. Perhaps the
widespread dissatisfaction with the McCollum case indicated that the
Court in applying a rigid concept of separation had ignored a deepseated sentiment based both on tolerance for parents who desire religious education for their children and on acceptance of the idea that
even in matters of public education due respect for the democratic
process should permit some discretion to the community in shaping its
educational policies.
The notion that released time seen in the context of compulsory
education laws has the effect of coercing children to accept religious
61 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948).
62 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952).
63 "In reality, released time does not mean releasing time for religious instruction; it
means releasing children for religious instruction and not releasing those who do not want
to partake in religious instruction. The refusal of the promoters of the program to accept a
dismissed-time system under which all children are released indicates quite clearly that they
depend on the nomelease of the other children as the factor inducing enrollment for
released-time religious instruction." PFBFFBR, CmmCH, STA.TB, .AND FRBBDOM 373 (1953).
fi4Jd., pp. 170-171, 351-353.
65West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178
(1943), overruling Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 60 S.Ct. 1010
(1940), which had held that a Jehovah's Witness child could be expelled from school for
refusal to take part in a flag salute exercise. Pfeffer details this development at pp. 519528, CmmcH, STA.TB, .AND FRBBDoM, and indicates bis approval of the overruling decision.
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education bears some scrutiny. The author states that this attempt to
insinuate religious education into the puqlic school system indicates an
attitude of defeatism on the part of those interested in religious education. They are looking to princes for their salvation.56 But perhaps it
may be countered that the argument that religious education is the
tempting inducement offered to students to escape from the compulsions of the public school suggests a rather low view of public education.
This argument is based on the premise that the public school represents
a kind of involuntary imprisonment, release from which may be effected
by attending religious education classes. May it be accepted as an unquestioned proposition of fact that religious instruction is so attractive
and public school education so repressive that parents and children will
invariably respond by choosing to escape the public school classroom?
Strangely the author concludes his discussion of this question with the
observation that in fact the overwhelming majority of children continue
to choose secular instruction.117 This statement of fact hardly supports
the compulsion theory.
The compulsion theory, if used to invalidate released time, is not
easily reconciled with the treatment of other problems related to public
education. The author contends, and rightly so, that public schools
should be allowed to release children on certain days in order to attend
special religious services of their faiths. 5 8 This practice he defends on
the ground of religious liberty and he states a good case. But is this not
another instance of released time but on a smaller scale? 59 Might it not
be equally relevant to argue that children are being coerced to attend
religious services since attendance at such services is the price they must
pay to be freed from the restraint of the public school system? But even
more important is the parallel presented by attendance at parochial
schools. It is conceded that parents not only may be permitted to send
their children to full-time parochial schools but that it is their constitutional right to do so. 60 Yet admittedly parents in sending their children
56 PFBFFBR, CnunCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 289-290 (1953). The suggestion that
the movement in favor of released time is an indication of religious defeatism is a doubleedged argument. It may just as well be suggested that opposition to released time suggests
an attitude of defeatism with respect to public schools, namely, that public education cannot survive if a reasonable accommodation of its program is made in order to serve those
parents who desire religious education for their children. Both arguments seem irrelevant
in discussing the constitutional aspects of the released time program.
57 Id., p. 373.
5s Id., pp. 596-597.
59 Justice Douglas cites this practice with approval as a precedent in support of released
time in his opinion in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952).
60 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571 (1925). For discussion of
this problem by the author, see CHURCH, STATE, AND FIU!BDOM 428-433, 510-519 (1953).
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to parochial schools are discharging their obligation under the compulsory education laws to give their children an education. It is conceded
that the public authorities may prescribe the teaching of certain secular
subjects in parochial schools and may inspect them to see whether
proper educational standards are observed. 61 Parents sending their
children to these schools get full credit for discharging their obligation
under the compulsory education laws even though religious subjects
are distinctly taught and the whole atmosphere of the school is distinctly
religious. It is not merely fanciful or frivolous to suggest that the parochial school system represents one hundred percent released time. Is it
not fair to suggest that the compulsion argument is equally relevant or
equally irrelevant? Children may secure release from all classes at the
public schools if they attend parochial schools; therefore, the compulsory education laws are being used to channel children into religious
education.
If release of children from classes on specific days in order to attend
special religious services is not only permitted but may even be required
in the interests of religious freedom and if release from all classes in the
public schools is constitutionally required in order to protect the freedom
of parents who wish to send their children to parochial schools, why
does release for one hour per week from public school instruction in
order to provide opportunity for religious education assume such extraordinary proportions as a form of coercion so as to require its invalidation in the name of separation of church and state?
This reviewer presents no brief for released time. He doubts _
whether much can be accomplished during this short time. Certainly
it is not even the larger part of the answer in regard to the problem of
religious education. But on the constitutional issue he agrees with what
Justice Douglas called the common sense of the matter in the Zorach
case62 and that is that nothing in the separation principle precludes the
state from making a reasonable accommodation of its program to :6.t the
purposes of religious education, and that this is an area where the predominant sentiment of the community should be permitted to govern.
This again is an instance where the abstract principle of separation
should yield to public policy bottomed on respect for the high and concrete imperative of religious liberty. 63 The reviewer is not arguing that
61 See the author's discussion, CmmCH, STATE, .AND FREEDOM 432-433 (1953).
62 See the quotation from his opinion in note 21 supra.
63 Professor Katz makes the point that even "dismissed time" arrangements, which

opponents of "released time" agree to be valid, involve aid to religion in one sense, but not
in a sense which violates the "neutrality" rule. "Such an accommodation is clearly permissible as an effort to keep the secular public school program from teaching by implication
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school boards are under a constitutional compulsion to enter into released time arrangements. This matter should be decided by operation
of the democratic processes within the community. Care should be
exercised that no actual pressure is placed on any student to attend
classes in religious education. But a proper sense of concern for the
non-participant does not require rejection of the program on constitutional grounds. A Jehovah's Witness child may not be required to take
part in a public school Hag salute exercise. He is permitted to abstain.64
But the public school is not required in deference to his religious convictions to abandon the Hag salute exercise even though it carries religious connotations for persons in this category and may, therefore, in
this sense be characterized as a religious exercise. Similarly it should be
possible to retain a released time program in aid of the religious liberty
of parents and children while doing justice to the non-participants.
Secular instruction in public schools can never be completely neutral respecting religious matters since education that does not take
account of the historical, social and cultural aspects of religion is education in a vacuum. Moreover, secular teaching proceeding on a nonreligious basis often impinges upon areas of religious belief and conviction. It is idle to speak of neutrality or of a solid wall of separation in
such cases. When the state permits a child to attend a parochial school
in satisfaction of the requirements under a compulsory education law
or when it permits children to be released from public schools for one
hour per week in order to get the benefit of religious education, the
state is moving in the direction of a more even-handed neutrality in an
area where government and religion overlap in their functions. To deny
the state the power to give credit for religious instruction is to identify
hostility with neutrality.
Turning from the released time program, the author discusses the
matter of religious exercises such as Bible reading and prayers in public
schools. 65 Here one may well agree with him. Religious ceremonials
and exercises and the deliberate indoctrination of religious ideas should
play no part in classrooms under the control of public school teachers.
The wide diversity of religious and non-religious beliefs in this country
requires that all such attempts be labeled as sectarian and violative of
the religious freedom guarantee. Discussing the use of garbed nuns as
teachers in public schools the author concludes that their teaching in
the unimportance of religion." See his article, ''Religion and State Neutrality," 20 UNIV.
Cm. L. RBv. 426 at 439 (1953).
64 See the reference to the cases in note 55 supra.
65 PFEFFER, CmrnCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 374-399

(1953).

1954]

CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM

843

garb does not in itself violate the separation idea but that it should be
permissible for states by legislation to prohibit the use of religious garb
by those teaching in its schools since the legislature may well decide
that the wearing of such garb marks an -undue intrusion of sectarian
influence into the public school system.66 Absent the garb, any qualified person should have the privilege of teaching in the public schools
regardless of religious affiliation, as the author points out.
In his thirteenth chapter Pfeffer turns to the question raised by the
Everson case07 which held that reimbursement out of public funds for
the cost of transporting children to parochial schools was only an indirect aid to religion and hence did not constitute an establishment of
religion in violation of the separation principle. Speaking for the majority in that case, Justice Black stated that this subsidy was intended
for the benefit of the child, and, furthermore, that since parochial school
children received instruction in secular subjects it was not improper to
provide such children with the same assistance in transportation as that
furnished public school children. The author regards both arguments
as untenable. 68 Safety in transportation could be secured by requiring
parochial schools to furnish adequate transportation and the argument
about secular subjects in parochial schools ignores the real character of
parochial schools. The author also criticizes69 the earlier decisions upholding the distribution at public expense of textbooks in secular
subjects to students in parochial as well as public schools. He states a
persuasive case in pointing out the artificialities of the reasoning in the
Everson case. The majority opinion having expressed a rigid separation
concept sought to avoid its implications by positing the difference between direct and indirect aid to religion. This is a distinction hard to
maintain. The author's position is that adherence to the wall of separation idea should preclude the state from furnishing textbooks and transportation for children in parochial schools. According to his contention
these are aids to religious education. The argument based on the teaching of secular subjects in parochial schools falls both because it ignores
the real character of parochial school education and because if admitted
it would logically justify the use of public funds to supply parochial
school buildings which in themselves are just as neutral and secular as
textbooks and buses. This reasoning is persuasive in pointing to the
futility of the distinction suggested by the Everson opinion. It does not
ao Id., pp. 412-417.
67 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947).
68 PFEPPER, CmmCH, STATE, AND FrumnoM 474-478 (1953).
69 Id., p. 469.
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follow that the case reached an incorrect result. Perhaps the reasoning
was faulty but the conclusion sound. Again, if we abandon a rigid
separation principle and start with the premise that the non-aid principle must yield to the higher principle of religious freedom which the
state should be allowed to observe in the interest of a genuine neutrality,
it is a fair argument that subsidies of this kind in aid of parochial schools
contribute to the religious freedom of parents and children in an area
where governmental and religious interests overlap. To many it may
appear that the state is acting with a greater even-handedness and neutrality when it affords :financial aid to all children who by attending one
school or another-whether public, parochial or private-are satisfying
the requirements of the compulsory education laws.
The reviewer is not contending that the Constitution requires subsidization of any of the costs of parochial school education. A state
may well decide to limit expenditures of public tax moneys for the bene:6.t of schools directly under public control. Such a classi:6.cation in regard to expenditure of public funds should be perfectly proper in terms
of permissive legislative power. Moreover, local constitutional provisions may explicitly prohibit aid of any kind for sectarian education,
and here the local policy must control. But these questions should not
be confused with the question whether the federal constitution prohibits aid to education on the more inclusive basis.
In his closing chapters the author deals with the distinctive problems raised with respect to the free exercise of religion. Here he deals
with a series of familiar questions most of which have come before the
Supreme Court in recent years as the result of the valiant and successful
efforts by Jehovah's Witnesses in asserting the freedom to carry out their
religious propaganda activities.70 This part of the book requires no
extended review. The author does an expert job in handling the legal
materials relating to these questions. He points out that this is one area
embraced in the freedom of expression category where the Supreme
Court has consistently adhered to the idea that the First Amendment
freedoms occupy a preferred place in terms of the judicial protection
accorded them and that the clear-and-present-danger test is still relevant
in the cases involving religious liberty.71
The reviewer is not indulging in idle flattery in characterizing Mr.
Pfeffer's book as one of high quality. We are all indebted to him for
the research, thinking, skillful organization and clarity of style that have
entered into its composition. His stand in favor of a rigid separation
70

See the reference in note 4 supra.
Cmm.CH, STATE, .AND FrumnoM 499-504 (1953).

71 Pl'BI'I'BR,
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theory proceeds from a conviction that nothing less will satisfy to protect both the freedom of religion and the freedom of government from
ecclesiastical domination. His position does not proceed from a bias
against religion but rather evinces great sensitivity to religious liberty
and respect for the freedom of both the believer and non-believer.
Americans generally agree that the separation principle is a good
one and that American experience demonstrates that government and
religion are both best served when their own separate spheres are recognized and when neither attempts to dominate or exploit the other. Certainly the present state of religious belief and organized religion in this
country makes clear that religion is strongest when it rests on voluntary
participation. But in application of the separation idea reasonable and
equally well-intentioned persons may easily disagree. Mr. Pfeffer belongs to a school which advocates rigid separation and is concerned with
keeping intact the wall of separation. Others, including the reviewer,
feel that it is futile to speak of a wall of separation when we are talking
about such interacting forces as religion and government, often engaged
in overlapping functions. The political community does not operate in
isolation from religious forces or immune to the impact of religious
ideas. And the religious community operates within the context of a
social structure where the power of government operates to furnish the
security necessary to the enjoyment of religious freedom. The wall-ofseparation metaphor is hardly apt as a description of this relationship.
A wall necessitates complete separation, but complete separation of religion and government is not supported by history, logic or common
sense. Moreover, the separation terminology is not found in the First
Amendment but is a convenient form of verbal shorthand to express
the two explicit restraints stated in the Constitution in favor of the free
exercise of religion and against an establishment of religion. Even the
no-aid principle is not expressly stated in the First Amendment but is
derived by implication from the non-establishment restraint. Since the
explicit free exercise principle often comes in conflict with the implied
no-aid principle, it is further apparent that the wall-of-separation metaphor is inept to describe the situation. For in such cases we are not
dealing with distinctive interests on opposite sides of a wall but rather
with a buffer zone of competing and conflicting interests where choices
must be made.
The reviewer is contending that so far as the First Amendment's
restrictions respecting non-establishment and religious freedom are concerned, a conceptualism founded on rigid absolutes and encysted in a
metaphor cannot furnish an adequate basis for judicial solution to the
admittedly difficult questions here presented. With respect to other
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constitutional limitations embodied both in the First Amendment and
in other parts of the Constitution, the absolutism of right is denied.
Rather the task of the courts is to identify the competing interests, to
weigh and appraise them, and in this process of judicial determination
to allow a large measure to legislative discretion in the choice of the
interest to be served. In terms of the First Amendment problems we are
considering this means an identification of the interests served by the
free exercise of religion with all that it connotes with respect to freedom
from discrimination against religion, the interests served by the nonestablishment of religion, and the permissive interests that the state may
properly seek to further in exercising powers that fall within the legitimate sphere of governmental powers but overlap areas of religious
interest and concern. Surely the public interest in matters of religious
concern itself becomes an appropriate subject for legislative concern
both because of the high place of religious liberty in our constitutional
scheme of things and because of the overlapping functions of government and religion in certain areas. Indeed, the opinion in the Zorach
case72 stands for just this proposition.
The wise resolution of these competing interests is no easy task. But
to identify the interests at stake is the beginning of wisdom in the determination of these questions. Results in some cases are clearly indicated.
Thus to appropriate money in direct aid of churches for payment of
church buildings and ministers' salaries is invalid even though it may
aid the exercise of religious freedom since the maintenance of churches
is itself not a governmental function and since it coerces the conscience
of non-believing taxpayers. This problem should be controlled by application of the non-establishment principle. On the other hand, to
grant tax exemptions for property ~sed for religious purposes, although
an aid to religion and a coercion of the conscience of non-believing taxpayers, may be sustained not simply because it promotes the free exercise of religion but because the legislature in the exercise of its taxing
power may elect to give equality of treatment to religious interests along
with charitable, educational and other non-pro:6.t interests that qualify
72 "When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our
traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the
public service to their 5Piritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the
constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious
groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do
believe. Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction
nor blend secular and sectarian education nor use secular institutions to force one or some
religion on any person. But we find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen
the effective scope of religious influence." Justice Douglas in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306 at 313, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952).
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for the tax exemption. Here freedom from discrimination against religion emerges as a dominant consideration worthy of legislative solicitude. Again, use of tax moneys to pay military chaplains may be sustained because the chaplaincy service helps to maintain freedom of
religion in an area where the government itself has a primary interest
because of its military powers. And, finally, governmental practices that
fit parochial schools into the scheme of the compulsory education laws
and legislative sanctions for released time arrangements are permissible
since here again religion and government overlap in their functions and
the legislature may properly decide that release from the obligations of
secular education is a fair means of mitigating discrimination against
religion in public education.73
The reviewer has previously emphasized the necessity of permitting
the usual functioning of the democratic process within the community
in regard to matters that come within the church-state area. Basic policies in regard to the purpose and operations of the public schools, supported by tax funds and serving a medium whereby a majority of parents discharge their obligation imposed by law to send their children t~
school, should be determined neither by courts nor by professional
educators but by state legislatures and in turn by local school boards
whose exercise of discretionary authority will reflect the demands of
the community. So far as the spending of tax funds in aid of religious
education is concerned, many states have constitutional provisions
which on their face are stricter than the language of the First Amendment. State courts have tended to construe them with a fair degree of
strictness. Subject to the specific provisions of their own constitutions,
state legislatures and school boards, responsive to the forces of public
opinion, should be free to adopt such policies as they see fit in regard
to the relation between public education and religious instruction, subject only to the restraint of the First Amendment translated into the
liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that they grant no religious
preference, abstain from use of the public classroom for sectarian indoctrination, and carefully respect the freedom of dissenters and nonconformists.
Certainly there should be a large area of legislative discretion where
what is permissive is not to be identified with what is either necessary
or what is prohibited. Again, released time in public schools may be
used as an illustration. Whether there is to be a released time program
73 Indeed, in regard to the privilege of parents to send their children to parochial schools
in discharge of their statutory obligation, the legislature has no choice since this privilege
belongs to the parent as a matter of constitutional right. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268

U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571 (1925).
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is essentially a legislative decision. If permitted by the state constitution, authorized by the legislature and approved by the local school
board in deference to local opinion, nothing found in the First Amendment and transposed into the Fourteenth Amendment should serve to
invalidate the program. On the other hand, nothing in the Constitution should require a legislature or school board to authorize or enter
into such a released time arrangement. Such an arrangement will promote religious freedom but its denial is no unlawful impairment of
religious liberty. Legislatures and school boards must be allowed elbow
room in their determination on this matter. Here we must be careful
to avoid the traditional American weakness of identifying our own preferences and predilections with the Constitution. Especially is this true
when we are dealing with matters of religious interest where emotions
are easily aroused and a rigid insistence on separation is easily donned
to cloak prejudice against religious groups.
The argument may be made that because of the religious and antireligious feelings that are excited and aggravated when new phases of
the church-state problem· are aired in public, a rigid separation doctrine should be followed by the courts in order that legislatures may
avoid these issues and religious organizations discouraged from agitating
programs that call for legislative authorization. A laudable motive
underlies this reasoning. These issues trench on sensitive areas. Public
discussion easily deteriorates into intemperate name-calling and false
charges. Honest advocates of rigid separation, many of, whom are sincere religionists, are unfairly charged with anti-religious beliefs. Fairminded supporters of released time arrangements are unjustly labeled
as enemies of the public school system. And many espouse rigid separation not because of reasoned consideration of the underlying problems
but because such espousal furnishes an effective outlet for deeply rooted
prejudices and suspicions with respect to religious organizations that
have assumed a position of importance, power and prestige in American
life. But despite these considerations, it is an illusion to suppose that
we can avoid these issues and the careful consideration required for
their wise solution. The erection of a mythical wall will not prevent
the intrusion of these questions into the public domain. Strong currents
of public opinion will persist despite the invocation of judicial absolutes
calculated to suppress them. On this we need only to observe that the
literal application of the separation idea in the McCollum case did not
serve to put the issue at rest. All these issues will persist, and in their
solution thoughtful citizens, legislatures and courts face the necessity
of carefully and soberly defining and weighing the conllicting interests
represented before them.

